Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention by Lehnhof, Lance S.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2002 | Issue 2 Article 16
5-1-2002
Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of
Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity
Status Under the European Convention
Lance S. Lehnhof
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the European Law Commons, Organizations Law Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lance S. Lehnhof, Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status Under the European
Convention, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 561 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2002/iss2/16
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02 10:28 PM 
 
561 
Freedom of Religious Association: The Right of 
Religious Organizations to Obtain Legal Entity Status 
Under the European Convention 
For centuries religious organizations, and particularly new reli-
gious organizations, have struggled to gain recognition as legitimate 
churches and to maintain the status of legal entities in European 
states.1 Indeed, the history of almost all religious organizations, and 
certainly of all the major religions in Europe (i.e., Judaism, 
Christianity [Catholicism and Protestantism generally, as well as 
multiple individual sects], and Islam) includes a period of 
persecution and illegitimacy in their infancies. In a more modern 
context, one scholar has suggested that each major religion under-
goes a process of being a “new” religion, with the attendant 
difficulties of attaining legitimacy, before slipping slowly into the 
societal mainstream.2 This initial period of infancy—the “dangerous 
sect stage”—often includes the ominous obstacle of obtaining legal 
entity status. Since the inability to obtain legal entity status often 
entails limitations or prohibitions on proselytism, many new religious 
movements are never able to mount the momentum to graduate 
from dangerous sect to legitimate religion. 
I. THE RIGHT OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS TO  
MAINTAIN A LEGAL ENTITY: AN INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, the international human rights debate has 
 
 1. Such struggles date back to the early years of the Roman Empire, as the Jews and 
the Christians, each in turn, struggled to gain recognition as a religio licita. For a discussion of 
anti-Semitism in the Greek and Roman Empires, and the development of certain policies of 
tolerance, see EDWARD H. FLANNERY, THE ANGUISH OF THE JEWS 3–24 (1985). For a more 
general discussion on the evolution of the treatment of Jews and Christians in the Roman Em-
pire, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
2–66 (2001), in which the authors discuss first the struggle of the Jews to attain religio licita 
status in the Roman Empire, and then the struggle of the Christians to finally do the same un-
der Constantine, and finally the establishment of the Christian church within the Roman Em-
pire to such an extent that it was able to persecute Jews and Protestants. Interestingly, the au-
thor also notes that the Protestant religions struggled through a similar evolution of treatment 
from persecutee to persecutor. See id. at 117–54. 
 2. See W. Cole Durham, Jr., The United States Experience with New Religious Move-
ments, 5 EUR. J. FOR CHURCH & ST. STUD. 213, 217 (1998). 
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
562 
given increased attention to the importance of legal entity status for 
all types of organizations. The European Court of Human Rights 
(“European Court”) in particular has made significant strides in rec-
ognizing that in order for the freedoms of association and religion—
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention” or 
“Convention”)3—to be meaningful, they must include a right to 
maintain legal entity status.4 The importance of legal entity status in 
our increasingly legalistic and bureaucratic world is clear; effective ac-
tion in this modern setting is difficult without the ability to act col-
lectively with legal personality. Such basic necessities as leasing space, 
collecting contributions, conducting business with others, producing 
and distributing materials, obtaining permits and licenses, and par-
ticipating in political and legal processes are difficult, if not impossi-
ble, in most countries without official entity status. Furthermore, le-
gal entity status is particularly important as organizations confront 
opposition groups, media organizations, and complex bureaucratic 
states.5 
These same concerns and obstacles apply to religious organiza-
tions, but with even more gravity. While perhaps not as blatantly dis-
criminatory and prejudicial as other forms of open hostility or perse-
cution of religious belief or practice, denial of legal entity status—
either through overly burdensome registration requirements, dis-
criminatory application of registration procedures, or explicit denial 
or revocation of registered status—has a significant impact on a reli-
 
 3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Conven-
tion]. 
 4. See, e.g., Sidiropoulos v. Greece, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1594, 1614 (“The Court 
points out that the right to form an association is an inherent part of the right set forth in Arti-
cle 11 [freedom of association] . . . . That citizens should be able to form a legal entity in order 
to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of the right 
to freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning.”); Af-
faire Eglise Metropolitaine de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, App. No. 45701/99, ¶118 
(2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int (“Additionally, one of the ways of exercising the right to 
manifest one’s religion, especially for a religious community, in the collective sense, is through 
the possibility of assuring the jurisdictional protection of the community, of its members and 
their possessions, such that Article 9 must be understood in the light not only of Article 11, 
but also in the light of Article 6.”) (the case was available only in French at the time this paper 
went to print—translation by author). 
 5. For a discussion of some of the difficulties faced throughout Europe by organiza-
tions without legal entity status, see infra notes 6–11. 
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gious organization’s ability to manifest its religious beliefs. In many 
countries, a religious community without legal entity status has diffi-
culty renting or owning property to use for religious services, collect-
ing donations, distributing literature and materials, receiving tax 
benefits, and proselytizing. 
Current examples of this struggle for legal entity status by reli-
gious groups in Europe are acutely obvious in Russia,6 Ukraine,7 
Bulgaria,8 Slovak Republic,9 Uzbekistan,10 and France,11 to name but 
 
 6. See BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, RUSSIA: 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (October 2001).  The report states: 
Local authorities continued to restrict the rights of some religious minorities in 
some regions. Despite court decisions which liberalized its interpretation, the com-
plex 1997 “Law on Religion,” which replaced a more generous 1990 law, seriously 
disadvantages religious groups that are new to the country by making it difficult for 
them to register as religious organizations, and thus obtain the status of juridical 
person, which includes the right to establish bank accounts, own property, issue in-
vitations to foreign guests, publish literature, and conduct worship services in pris-
ons and state-owned hospitals. 
This report also discusses the treatment of certain religious groups under the current law, in-
cluding their denial of legal entity status. For a discussion of historical norms in the Soviet Un-
ion, see Albert Boiter, Law and Religion in the Soviet Union, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 119–21 
(1987) (discussing conditions in the Soviet Union prior to the collapse of communism under 
the Law on Religious Associations and its use in controlling and persecuting religion). For a 
discussion of the current issues facing religious organizations in Russia, see generally T. Jeremy 
Gunn, Caesar’s Sword: The 1997 Law of the Russian Federation on the Freedom of Conscience 
and Religious Associations, 12 EMORY INT’L. L. REV. 43 (1998); W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lau-
ren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations: An 
Analytical Appraisal, 12 EMORY INTL’L L. REV. 101 (1998). 
 7. One commentator acknowledges that Ukraine is less restrictive than Russia in regu-
lating legal entity status of religious groups, but nevertheless faces difficulties: 
Unregistered organizations are without legal standing and thus cannot, for example, 
invite foreign missionaries, buy or rent property, or publish literature. . . . But regis-
tration is not so straightforward in practice. Extra-legal procedures, unwarranted de-
lays, and bureaucratic whims beset the applicant. 
. . . . 
Even if a religious organization does achieve registration, it remains at the mercy of 
the government’s goodwill to effectuate many of its activities, e.g., renting a meet-
ing facility, inviting foreign missionaries, importing religious literature, avoiding har-
assment by police or tax auditors, and buying or constructing a building for wor-
ship. This is no accident. The procedures require government approval and 
oversight of a religious organization’s even routine activities. Thus the government 
has arbitrary power to apply pressure against religious organizations at multiple 
chokepoints. 
John Moroz Smith, Note, The Icon and the Tracts: A Restrained Renaissance of Religious Lib-
erty in Ukraine, 2001 BYU L. REV. 815, 845–46 (footnote omitted). 
 8. See Atanas Krussteff, An Attempt at Modernization: The New Bulgarian Legislation 
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a few. Unfortunately it appears that despite a promising wave of in-
ternational documents declaring the immutability of religious free-
dom, an increasing number of European states are also simultane-
ously tightening the noose on new religious movements by imposing 
increasingly strict restrictions on registration of legal entities, visa is-
suances, and proselytism.12 While these examples indicate an increase 
in governmental regulation of religious entities in some areas of 
Europe, it is certainly not a problem of recent origin, as governments 
 
in the Field of Religious Freedom, 2001 BYU L. REV. 575, 593–601 (describing the difficulties 
of registering as a religious legal entity and the penalties for those religious groups that are not 
“duly authorized”). 
 9. See generally Martin Dojcar, The Religious Freedom and Legal Status of Churches, 
Religious Organizations, and New Religious Movements in the Slovak Republic, 2001 BYU L. 
REV. 429 (discussing the importance of registration in the Slovak Republic and the advantages 
it affords, such as financial support from the government, right of access to public facilities, and 
other benefits; also discussing the registration requirements in the Slovak Republic, including a 
requirement that the organization prove that it has at least 20,000 adherents before it can even 
apply for registration; pointing out that since 1990 only one religious organization has met the 
registration requirements and been granted registration). 
 10. See generally Grant Garrard Beckwith, Comment, Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, 
and Religious Liberty—An Appraisal of Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations,” 2000 BYU L. REV. 997 (discussing new legislation for religious or-
ganizations in Uzbekistan, part of which limits the ability of religious organizations to register 
and thereby obtain legal entity status). 
 11. See Hannah Clayson Smith, Comment, New Religious Movements in France, 2000 
BYU L. REV. 1099, 1119–20, 1130–31 (discussing the implications of France’s new anti-sect 
policies, and in particular a proposed law, which has subsequently been enacted, that allows the 
government to dissolve religious organizations if they exhibit certain characteristics that the law 
considers dangerous). 
 12. See John Witte, Jr., A Dickensian Era of Religious Rights: An Update on Religious 
Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 707 (2001). Witte describes the 
treatment of new religious movements as follows: 
A new war for souls has thus broken out in these regions, a war to reclaim the tradi-
tional cultural and moral souls of these new societies, and a war to retain adherence 
and adherents to the indigenous faiths. In part, this is a theological war: rival reli-
gious communities have begun to demonize and defame each other and to gather 
themselves into ever more dogmatic and fundamentalist stands. The ecumenical 
spirit of the previous decades is giving way to sharp new forms of religious balkani-
zation. In part, this is a legal war: local religious groups have begun to conspire with 
their political leaders to adopt statutes and regulations restricting the constitutional 
rights of their foreign religious rivals. Beneath shiny constitutional veneers of reli-
gious freedom for all and unqualified ratification of international human rights in-
struments, several countries of late passed firm new antiproselytism laws, cult regis-
tration requirements, tightened visa controls, and adopted various other 
discriminatory restrictions on new or newly arrived religions. 
Id. at 711 (citations omitted). For an example of this trend in several European states, see dis-
cussion supra notes 6–11. 
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have historically used the power to grant and deny legal entity status 
as a means of favoring majority religions and dissolving or denying 
legal entity status to minority religious groups.13 While few countries 
discriminate openly, many of the European statutes governing legal 
entity status for religious organizations contain strict requirements 
on qualification for legal entity status, which effectively prohibit 
many new religious movements from becoming legal entities.14 
Unfortunately, the European Court has not yet directly faced the 
issue of whether the freedom of association under Article 11 of the 
European Convention includes a right for religious organizations to 
maintain legal entity status. Nevertheless, a logical analysis of the 
European Court’s jurisprudence under both Articles 11 and 9 (free-
dom of religion and belief), as well as the history of both Articles, 
gives a strong indication that religious organizations have a right to 
legal entity status under the Convention. This Note will examine the 
applicability of the European Court’s freedom of association cases in 
the religious context. In particular, Part II will summarize the cur-
rent state of the law regarding freedom of association under the 
European Convention as well as its history. Part III will discuss the 
interrelationship between the freedom of association and the free-
dom of religion and belief, and the importance of regulating reli-
gious organizations in a manner consistent with Article 11 of the 
Convention. Part IV will discuss the potential limits of these free-
doms, and the parameters that a state may properly place on the 
right of religious organizations to maintain legal entity status. Part V 
will provide a brief conclusion. 
II. ARTICLE 11 AND THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
At the present time, the liberty of association has become a neces-
sary guaranty against the tyranny of the majority . . . . There are no 
countries in which associations are more needed . . . than those 
 
 13. See Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 
MICH. L. REV. 1499, 1510, 1518–20 (1973) (discussing the old system in Europe and the 
early American colonies of governments granting charters to religious groups, primarily major-
ity religions such as the Catholic Church in England and the established churches in the 
American colonies; also discussing historic examples of governments using dissolution as a 
means of persecuting minority religions). 
 14. See supra notes 6–11 (discussing common regulations of legal entity status in various 
countries of Europe and their effects on new religious movements seeking to establish and re-
tain legal entity status). 
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which are democratically constituted. In aristocratic nations, the 
body of the nobles and the wealthy are in themselves natural asso-
ciations, which check the abuses of power. In countries where such 
associations do not exist, if private individuals cannot create an arti-
ficial and temporary substitute for them, I can see no permanent 
protection against the most galling tyranny; and a great people may 
be oppressed with impunity by a small faction, or by a single 
individual.15 
Recognition of the freedom of association in modern interna-
tional human rights instruments dates back to the first of those 
documents, the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“Universal Declaration”).16 Article 20 of the Universal Declaration 
proclaims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association.”17 Consistent with every other major international 
instrument to enumerate fundamental human rights, the European 
Convention explicitly protects the freedom of association in Article 
11.18 
A. The Text and History 
Article 11 reads as follows: 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights 
other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a de-
mocratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restric-
 
 15. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 97 (Richard D. Heffner ed., 
Mentor 1956) (1835). Speaking of America, Tocqueville also wrote: 
Nothing, in my opinion, is more deserving of our attention than the intellectual and 
moral associations in America. The political and industrial associations of that coun-
try strike us forcibly; but the others elude our observation, or, if we discover them, 
we understand them imperfectly . . . . It must, however, be acknowledged, that they 
are as necessary to the American people as the former, and perhaps more so. 
Id. at 201. 
 16. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 17. Id. art. 20. 
 18. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 11. 
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tions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed 
forces, of the police or of the administration of the state.19 
The text of Article 11 follows closely the pattern of other inter-
national religious freedom provisions. The general pattern includes 
the following elements: (1) a definition of the protected human 
right; (2) a prohibition on all state intrusion upon that right unless 
the intrusion is “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic 
society” in pursuit of certain legitimate state interests; and (3) a list-
ing of which objectives qualify as legitimate state interests in infring-
ing upon the particular right at issue. This first element establishes 
when a state had infringed upon the right, and the last two elements 
establish the three-step analysis used to determine whether the state 
is justified in infringing upon the right and may therefore avoid li-
ability. This three-step analysis applies equally to infringements of 
Article 11 and Article 9 freedoms. 
First, the state must show that the infringement is prescribed by 
law. This means that a state may not infringe upon religious free-
doms and hide behind administrative discretion but must explicitly, 
either in written or judicially created law, prescribe the act or policy 
that intrudes upon the Article 9 right. 
Second, the state must show that the intrusion is in pursuit of a 
legitimate aim. The legitimate aim must be one that is specifically 
mentioned in the Article itself. Interestingly, the lists of legitimate 
aims differ amongst the various provisions, apparently in recognition 
of the unique risks that each human right could pose should it be 
abused. 
The history of Article 11 indicates that the drafters of the Euro-
pean Convention considered the freedom of association and assem-
bly to be among the most fundamental human rights and included 
the general protections of Article 11 in the very earliest drafts.20 In 
fact, the only disagreement among the drafters appears to have been 
the question of whether to mention trade unions in the freedom of 
association clause (as it now appears), to provide a separate provision 
specifically protecting the right to join trade unions, or to leave the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. See statement by Mr. Teitgen (Aug. 19, 1945), in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 
TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 167–68 
(1975). 
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discussion of trade unions out completely.21 The fact that several 
drafts make no mention of trade unions and that other drafts sepa-
rate the right to join trade unions from the more general right of as-
sembly and association gives a strong indication that the drafters of 
the Convention did not intend to limit the scope of the freedom of 
association to trade unions alone. 
Third, the state must show that the intrusion is necessary in a 
democratic society, which has been interpreted as requiring a show-
ing that the means used by the state are “proportionate to the le-
gitimate aim pursued” and meet a “pressing social need.”22 This test 
appears to set a very high bar, particularly in cases under Articles 9 
and 11 where the list of legitimate aims is so short.  
B. The Court’s Article 11 Jurisprudence:  
An Expansion of Associative Rights 
As the cases below will illustrate, the European Court has vigor-
ously protected Article 11 freedoms and has only rarely upheld gov-
ernmental intrusion upon associative rights. Since a majority of the 
association cases has resulted in decisions in favor of the private par-
ties, the cases give plentiful guidance as to what types of associations 
are protected and very little guidance regarding the kinds of threats 
that will justify state intrusion on the freedom of association. 
Nevertheless, the European Court’s Article 11 jurisprudence in-
cludes some significant indications of the direction that the court is 
heading in this area of the law. Most significantly, while the court 
has never been asked to resolve the question directly, the court ap-
pears willing to recognize the right of religious organizations to reg-
ister and retain legal entities as part of the freedom of association. 
1. Freedom and Democracy Party 
In the case of Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey,23 the 
European Court considered whether Turkey had justifiably dissolved 
the ÖZDEP Party, a political party committed to establishing a de-
 
 21. See 4 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 52–64 (1975); 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE TRAVAUX 
PREPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 207 (1975). 
 22. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 49 (1993). 
 23. Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, App. No. 23885/94 (1999), at 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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mocratic assembly that is more representative of the minority peoples 
of Turkey, and specifically the Kurds.24 The Turkish Constitutional 
Court dissolved the party on the grounds “that its programme was 
apt to undermine the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of 
the nation and violated both the Constitution and sections 78(a) and 
81(a) and (b) of the Law on the regulation of political parties.”25 
The ÖZDEP Party then appealed to the European Court. The 
court held that while the state was acting in pursuit of a legitimate 
state aim—protecting national security and territorial integrity, pre-
venting disorder, and protecting the rights and freedoms of others—
the dissolution of the ÖZDEP Party was not “necessary in a democ-
ratic society.”26 In particular, the court held that it could find noth-
ing in the party’s program that could be considered a call to violence 
or a rejection of democratic government.27 Similarly, the court held 
that there must be a “pressing social need” and that merely calling 
for governmental reform does not create such a need without some 
threat of violence.28 Based upon these findings, the court found a 
violation of Article 11.29 
Essentially Freedom and Democracy Party stands for the general 
rule that the freedom of association cannot be impeded until the as-
sociation poses a threat to democratic order. Such a rule strikes the 
necessary balance between the freedom of the individual and the 
danger that associations with malicious intent can pose to a democ-
ratic state. While most associations pose no realistic threat to democ-
ratic order, occasionally some do. An example of a dangerous asso- 
 
 
 24. See id. ¶ 8. 
 25. Id. ¶ 14. 
 26.  Id. ¶ 48. 
 27. See id. ¶ 40. 
 28. See id. ¶ 44.  The court noted: 
[T]he Court has previously held that one of the principal characteristics of democ-
racy is the possibility it offers of resolving a country’s problems through dialogue, 
without recourse to violence, even when they are irksome. Democracy thrives on 
freedom of expression. From that point of view, there can be no justification for 
hindering a political group solely because it seeks to debate in public the situation of 
part of the State’s population and to take part in the nation’s political life in order to 
find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable of satisfying everyone con-
cerned. 
Id. 
 29. See id. ¶ 48. 
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ciation will be discussed later, in the case of Refah Partisi and Others 
v. Greece (“Welfare Party Case”).30 
2. United Communist Party of Turkey 
In the nearly identical case of United Communist Party of Turkey 
v. Turkey the court addressed the Turkish Constitutional Court’s dis-
solution of the United Communist Party of Turkey (“TBKP”), the 
eventual successor of another dissolved successor of the ÖZDEP 
Party.31 In analyzing the case, the European Court made an initial 
holding that has significance for religious groups seeking to rely 
upon Article 11. The court explicitly rejected the claim of the Turk-
ish government that Article 11 applied only to trade unions.32 The 
government had argued that since the language of Article 11 refers 
to the “freedom of association with others, including the right to 
form and to join trade unions . . . ,” the right of association was in-
tended largely for the purpose of protecting trade unions and there-
fore excluded political parties from the scope of Article 11.33 The 
court rejected this argument, and held that “trade unions are but 
one example among others of the form in which the right to free-
dom of association may be exercised.”34 The court further explained 
that 
even more persuasive than the wording of Article 11 . . . is the fact 
that political parties are a form of association essential to the proper 
functioning of democracy. In view of the importance of democracy 
in the Convention system, . . . there can be no doubt that political 
parties come within the scope of Article 11.35 
While some may argue that political parties maintain a more 
critical role in democratic political processes than religious organiza-
tions, it could also be argued that religious groups are also “essential 
to the proper functioning of democracy.” As the court later stated in 
this same case, “there can be no democracy without pluralism.”36 
 
 30. App. Nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98 (2001), at http://www. 
echr.coe.int [hereinafter Welfare Party Case]; see discussion infra Part II.C. 
 31. United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1. 
 32. See id. ¶¶ 24–25. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. ¶ 25. 
 36. See id. ¶ 43. 
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
561] Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention 
 571 
Considering the importance granted to the protection of religious 
pluralism by the drafters of the Convention, it is hard to argue that 
they did not intend for religious groups to play an essential role in 
the functioning of democratic government under the Convention.37 
Beyond this initial holding, the court came to a similar conclu-
sion regarding the dissolution of the TBKP as it did with the 
ÖZDEP Party. Among the government’s reasons for dissolving the 
TBKP were the party’s alleged attempts to incite the public to vio-
lence in order to protect the interests of the Kurdish minority in the 
government, as well as the party’s use of the term “communist” in its 
party name.38 The court rejected the claim that the use of a particular 
term is sufficient grounds for dissolution.39 The court also held that, 
similar to the ÖZDEP Party, the TBKP’s program did not suffi-
ciently pose a threat to national security or other legitimate interests 
of the state.40 
3. Sidiropoulos 
The two cases discussed above provide a general understanding 
of the types of associations and organizations that will be protected 
by Article 11. Those cases left only two important issues unresolved: 
(1) the outer boundary, or limits, of Article 11 freedoms, and (2) a 
specific guarantee that the freedom of association guarantees a right 
to maintain a legal entity. The first of these issues was not resolved 
until very recently with the court’s decisions in the Welfare Party 
Case, discussed in the next section. The second of these issues was 
resolved in the case of Sidiropoulos v. Greece.41 
In Sidiropoulos, the court established the important principle that 
the freedom of association includes a right to form and maintain a 
legal entity.42 The case began when a group of Greek citizens of Ma-
cedonian descent attempted to form a non-profit association called 
the “Home of Macedonian Civilisation.”43 The participants listed 
their objectives in their memorandum of association as 
 
 37. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 38. See United Communist Party of Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 49. 
 39. See id. ¶¶ 53–54. 
 40. See id. ¶ 60. 
 41. Sidiropoulos v. Greece, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1594, 1616–17. 
 42. See id. ¶ 40. 
 43. See id. ¶ 7. 
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(a) the cultural, intellectual and artistic development of [the asso-
ciation’s] members and of the inhabitants of Florina in general and 
the fostering of a spirit of cooperation, solidarity and love between 
them; (b) cultural decentralisation and the preservation of intellec-
tual and artistic endeavours and traditions and of the civilisation’s 
monuments and, more generally, the promotion and development 
of [their] folk culture; and (c) the protection of the region’s natural 
and cultural environment.44 
Despite these ostensibly peaceful intentions, the Florina Court of 
First Instance refused the application for registration on the grounds 
that “[s]ome of the founder members of the association . . . have en-
gaged in promoting the idea that there is a Macedonian minority in 
Greece . . .”45 The Greek court further submitted that “the true ob-
jective of the aforementioned association is not the one indicated in 
clause 2 of the memorandum of association but the promotion of 
the idea that there is a Macedonian minority in Greece, which is con-
trary to the country’s national interest and consequently contrary to 
law.”46 
In holding that this refusal of legal entity status violated Article 
11, the European Court again followed the traditional three-step 
analysis.47 After finding that the intrusion was prescribed by law, the 
court considered whether the state was pursuing a legitimate aim and 
concluded that the government had acted to protect its national se-
curity and to prevent disorder.48 However, this decision seems largely 
justified primarily by the conflict then raging in the Balkans. The 
European Court stated that in light of the Balkan situation the Greek 
Court of Appeals legitimately based its refusal on its fear that a Ma-
cedonian nationalist group might pose a revolutionary threat.49 
Without the threatening nature of that context it is quite possible the 
European Court’s analysis could have ended with a determination 
that there was no legitimate aim in denying the application. It is also 
significant that at one point in the analysis the court pointed out that 
the state’s objective of “upholding . . . Greece’s cultural traditions 
 
 44. Id. ¶ 8. 
 45. Id. ¶ 10. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. ¶ 39. 
 49. See id. 
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and historical and cultural symbols” was not a legitimate aim.50 
Having determined that the state was pursuing a legitimate in-
terest, the court turned to whether the denial of legal entity status 
was necessary in a democratic society. The court began this part of 
the analysis by asserting, “That citizens should be able to form a le-
gal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is 
one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of associa-
tion, without which that right would be deprived of any meaning.”51 
Turning then to whether there was a “pressing social need” requir-
ing interference and whether the means used to interfere were “pro-
portionate to the legitimate aim pursued,” the court determined that 
there was no evidence that the applicants posed a threat to the coun-
try and therefore no pressing need existed.52 In explaining that the 
existence of a cultural minority attempting to protect its culture did 
not threaten any of these state interests, the court stated “the exis-
tence of minorities and different cultures in a country was a historical 
fact that a ‘democratic society’ had to tolerate and even protect and 
support according to the principles of international law.”53 
The Sidiropoulos case marks a significant step in Article 11 juris-
prudence since it firmly links the right to legal entity status with the 
freedom of association under Article 11. The case is also significant 
in that it indicates the direction the court is taking in expanding the 
specific elements of the freedom of association under Article 11 and 
in vigorously enforcing Article 11 freedoms generally. 
Simple logic suggests that the right to legal entity status estab-
lished in Sidiropoulos would not be limited to non-religious organiza-
tions, but rather would protect religious and non-religious organiza-
tions equally in their efforts to maintain and retain legal entity status. 
Nevertheless, the extension of this right to legal entity status to reli-
gious organizations requires the resolutions of two additional poten-
tial counter-arguments. The first issue is how far Article 11 extends: 
in other words, what types of associative activity will justify state in-
trusion, and, more specifically, whether this is the type of activity in 
which religious organizations are likely to engage. This first issue was 
largely clarified in the Welfare Party Case and will be discussed in the 
 
 50. Id. ¶¶ 37–38. 
 51. Id. ¶ 40. 
 52. Id. (“There was nothing in the case file to suggest that any of the applicants had 
wished to undermine Greece’s territorial integrity, national security or public order.”). 
 53. Id. ¶ 41. 
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next subsection. The second potential issue involves the interplay be-
tween the freedom of association and the freedom of religion and 
whether there is a potential argument that religious organizations 
should be treated differently—less favorably—than other types of as-
sociations. This second issue will be addressed in Part III. Without 
clarification from the European Court on both of these issues, reli-
gious organizations have previously had little success in defending 
the existence of a right to legal entity status.54 
C.  Welfare Party Case: The Final Piece of the Article 11 Puzzle 
As discussed in the previous section, a potential problem with the 
court’s Article 11 jurisprudence was the lack of a definition of the 
limits of the freedom of association. The Welfare Party Case defines 
the types of acts a group must perform, and the kinds of threats to 
the state it must pose, before the state may justifiably deny the group 
the freedom to associate. 
1. An introduction and a disclaimer 
It is important to note at the outset that the Welfare Party Case 
has significant implications on other fronts and is likely to receive 
criticism from several directions. It is likely, for example, that those 
concerned about the ability of Islamic states to function comfortably 
in the European system and about the compatibility of certain Is-
lamic doctrines with the principles of the European Convention, will 
sharply criticize the case. While this issue is beyond the scope of this 
paper, it is worthwhile to note a few examples of the court’s misun-
derstanding of several Islamic principles, since these misunderstand-
ings led to the court’s conclusion that the Welfare Party posed a 
threat to the sovereignty and security of Turkey. 
For example, the court defined the term “jihad” as a doctrine 
“whose primary meaning is a holy war, to be waged until the total 
domination of Islam in society is secured.”55 While the court was 
obviously relying on several speeches by Welfare Party officials, in 
which they describe the concept of jihad as a potentially violent 
campaign, the court failed to recognize this as an extreme minority  
 54. See generally Cole Durham, Freedom of Religion and Belief: Laws Affecting the Struc-
turing of Religious Communities, 4 ODIHR BACKGROUND PAPER (1999) (discussing the vari-
ous international documents used to argue for such a right and the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of such arguments). 
 55. Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶ 74. 
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the court failed to recognize this as an extreme minority view. Most 
Islamic scholars agree that there are at least two, and perhaps several, 
possible definitions of jihad.56 The most common definition of jihad 
is a struggle, usually a struggle for justice, righteousness, or a better 
way of life.57 The court appears to have ignored this more popular 
form of jihad and concluded prematurely that jihad means a violent 
“holy war.”58 Similarly, the court made mistaken assumptions about 
the concept of the “sharia.”59 
 
 56. See, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICS AND RELIGION 425 (Robert Wuthnow ed., 
1998) (“The Islamic idea of jihad, which is derived from the Arabic root meaning ‘to strive’ or 
‘to make an effort,’ connotes a wide range of meanings, from an inward spiritual struggle to 
attain perfect faith to an outward material struggle to promote justice and the Islamic social 
system.”); MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 118–46 (1997).  Ruth-
ven explains jihad in the following way: 
Jihad, like the word fatwa, is an Islamic term that has entered the contemporary 
lexicon, not least because of its use by modern Islamist movements, some of which 
have been actively involved in terrorism, kidnapping and other violent activities. In 
its primary meaning the word means ‘exertion’ or ‘struggle’, and its use in the tradi-
tional Islamic discourse is very far from being confined to military matters. The usual 
translation ‘holy war’ is therefore misleading. Many forms of activity are included 
under the term. In the classical formulations the believer may undertake jihad ‘by his 
heart; his tongue; his hands; and by the sword’—the foremost of these being the 
first. 
Id. at 118. 
 57. See RUTHVEN, supra note 56, at 118; HUSSEIN KHALID AL-HUSSEIN & AHMAD 
HUSSEIN SAKR, INTRODUCING ISLAM TO NON-MUSLIMS, available at http://www.usc.edu/ 
dept/MSA/reference/glossary/term.JIHAD.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001). 
 58. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶¶ 68, 74. 
 59. For example, the court makes the sweeping statement, “The sharia provisions con-
cerning, among other matters, criminal law, corporal punishment as a criminal penalty and the 
status of women were not compatible with the Convention.” Id. However, the sharia is gener-
ally defined as the concept of having no separation between the rule of government and the 
law of God. As one author has put it, “In principle this remarkably comprehensive scheme al-
lows no ultimate distinction between religion and morality, law and ethics. All are seen as pro-
ceeding directly from the command of God, though there is room for humans to argue about 
the details.” RUTHVEN, supra note 56, at 86. While closer examination of the implications un-
der the Convention of instituting the sharia should be left to those more familiar with the 
complexities of the sharia, it is sufficient to note here that it is unclear that the sharia is per se 
incompatible with the principles of the Convention. Several authors identify the flexibility of 
the sharia as a potential means of adapting its application in the modern world. See id. at 75; 
ALFRED GUILLAUME, ISLAM 167–93 (1990). Professor Guillaume specifically discusses the 
history of changes that have taken place under sharia rule in countries such as Egypt, Algeria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon, including grants of increasingly equal rights to women, changes in prop-
erty law, and changes in the criminal law. See GUILLAUME, supra, at 171–93. His discussion of 
the rule of law in countries such as Algeria under the rule of the French are particularly instruc-
tive in this context, since they indicate the potential for congruence between Western princi-
ples of democracy and laicité and the doctrines of the sharia. 
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These mistaken conclusions threaten to create a dangerous di-
chotomy between the Convention’s protection of religious freedom 
and its protection of the rule of law. While it is clearly appropriate for 
the court to allow a state to prosecute and punish those who legiti-
mately threaten the sovereignty of the state, even if done in the name 
of religion, a broad condemnation of jihad or sharia would presuma-
bly include many activities, within the more peaceful definitions of 
those terms, which pose no threat whatsoever to public safety, public 
order, health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. Such a 
policy would potentially allow state condemnation of religious activi-
ties that would otherwise be protected under the Convention, such 
as proselytism.60 
Considering the troubling implications of the Welfare Party Case 
for the future of Islamic countries under the European Convention, 
some will undoubtedly question the viability of the case as respected 
precedent. However, it is important to recognize that the case never-
theless provides useful precedent for use in interpreting the Euro-
pean Convention. Despite the troubling implications of the court’s 
treatment of important Islamic doctrines, the actual holding of the 
case turns largely on the extreme nature of the acts committed by the 
Welfare Party, and not on the Islamic nature of those acts. As dis-
cussed in more detail below, the court’s conclusions about the dan-
gers presented by the Welfare Party were likely justified on the facts, 
since the party officials appeared, at least arguably, to be encouraging 
violent removal of the Turkish government and the establishment of 
a theocratic government. Therefore, the court’s mistaken attribution 
of these violent and undemocratic characteristics to concepts com-
monly practiced and adhered to by traditional, nonviolent Muslims is 
not essential to the holding of the case. 
It is essential that critics of the case not overlook the implications 
of the case for the freedoms of association and religion. Despite 
some of the potentially troublesome dicta, the actual holding of the 
court identifies several important standards under the Convention 
that relate to the freedoms of association and religion. In particular, 
the case establishes the outer limits of the freedom of association. 
Before examining those limits specifically, a brief introduction to the 
facts of the case is helpful. 
 
 60. The European Court has affirmatively protected the right of religious groups to en-
gage in proselytism. See Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
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2. The facts 
At first glance the Welfare Party Case does not appear to be that 
different factually from other Article 11 cases dealing with the disso-
lution of political parties, and particularly the Turkish cases, which 
essentially pose the question of whether the state—Turkey—was jus-
tified in dissolving a political party.61 However, there are some im-
portant, yet perhaps subtle, differences that explain the very different 
outcomes. 
Before continuing, it is important to recognize the unique geo-
graphical genesis of the case. Turkey is uniquely situated among the 
states governed by the European Convention. With over 65 million 
inhabitants, Turkey is one of the largest members of the European 
Convention.62 More significantly in this context, Turkey’s population 
is approximately 99% Muslim, most of which are Sunni.63 Not only is 
it unique in comparison to the predominantly Christian rest of 
Europe, but it is also unique in that no other signatory to the Con-
vention claims any religion as such a vast majority.64 
These unique qualities pose particularly interesting issues for 
Turkey in its attempts to assimilate into Europe. First, it must oper-
ate in a system of rules, both written and unwritten, and laws, both 
positive and natural, that are premised upon Christian principles and 
values. The delegates involved in drafting the Convention came from 
Christian countries, and while they were certainly concerned with 
protecting all peoples, the issues facing their predominantly Christian 
constituencies undoubtedly influenced them. The second issue posed 
by Turkey’s unique position under the Convention is the application 
of the Western principles of laïcité and liberal democracy in a coun-
try with a long history of being an Islamic state. Despite the earnest 
 
 61. See discussion of cases cited supra Part II.B. 
 62. See Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Background 
Note: Turkey (Oct. 1999), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/ 
irf_turkey.html. 
 63. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM: TURKEY, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_ 
turkey.html (Sept. 2000). 
 64. Not even Italy’s 85% Roman Catholic or Greece’s 94–97% Greek Orthodox popula-
tions control such a commanding majority. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 
ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITALY, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/ 
human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_ italy.html (Sept. 2000); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL 
REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: GREECE, at http://www.state.gov/ 
www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_ greece.html (Sept. 2000). 
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efforts of many in Turkey to adapt to these unfamiliar structures and 
principles, there are many that would prefer a return to the theo-
cratic ways of the past.65 
It was in this historical and demographic context that Turkey be-
gan its struggle with political parties aimed at restoring the Islamic 
theocracy of prior times. This struggle began long before the Welfare 
(Refah) Party was ever organized, since the Welfare Party was merely 
the successor, in a line of successors, of a previously dissolved party.66 
The establishment of the Welfare Party followed the dissolution of 
the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) and the National Sal-
vation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi), both of which were dissolved by 
the Turkish Constitutional Court for advocating the establishment of 
a theocratic, Islamic regime.67 With each dissolution the majority of 
the parties’ members banded together and initiated another party, 
seeking essentially the same objectives, although changing the official 
statements of the party to reflect a less revolutionary or violent plat-
form.68 
In January 1998, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Welfare 
Party and banned six of its leaders, including the party chairman and 
coalition government leader Necmettin Erbakan, from political life 
for five years.69 At the time of its dissolution, the Welfare Party held 
the plurality position in the legislature with 158 of the 450 seats.70 
The Constitutional Court’s rationale for its decision was that the 
party was “a ‘centre’ . . . of activities contrary to the principles of 
secularism.”71 As the basis of this rationale, the Constitutional Court 
cited a long list of activities, public statements, and policies of the 
party and its leaders, which the court characterized as threats to the 
secular state.72 Included on this list were such things as the wearing 
of Islamic headscarves by party leaders during official actions, state-
ments by Mr. Erbakan and others advocating the establishment of a 
 
 65. The Welfare Party itself maintained as its platform a desire to establish the sharia and 
a multijuridical system in which at least the Muslims in Turkey would be ruled civilly by a Mus-
lim government. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30. 
 66. See Niyazi Öktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU L. REV. 371, 395–400. 
 67. See id. at 395-96. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶¶ 22, 29. 
 70. See id. ¶ 10. 
 71. Id. ¶ 11. 
 72. See id. ¶ 25. 
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theocratic regime and a multijuridical system in which citizens are 
governed by the laws of their respective religions, incitement of the 
public to a holy war (“jihad”), statements allegedly inciting the peo-
ple to a violent overthrow of the government, and other similar acts 
and statements.73 The government alleged that these facts illustrated 
a threat to the social order, and perhaps the national security of the 
state, and that therefore the dissolution was necessary.74 
In response to these allegations, the applicants alleged that the 
state had violated Article 11 in dissolving the party since the party 
posed no direct threat to the state and since the statements by cer-
tain leaders were taken out of context.75 In holding that the dissolu-
tion was not a violation of Article 11, the European Court rejected 
the applicants’ assertions that the statements were taken out of con-
text and assumed that the incitements to establish a new form of 
theocratic government were legitimate.76 The court further con-
cluded that the party’s threats and political aims were “neither theo-
retical nor illusory, but achievable.”77 This is the critical finding that 
makes the Welfare Party Case different from other previous Article 
11 cases because in no previous case had the court found that the as-
sociation posed a credible threat to the state.78 The importance of 
the legitimacy of the threat is illustrated by the court’s careful identi-
fication of the factual grounds upon which it based its decision, ex-
plaining that it was not the specific actions or statements of the party 
leaders that justified dissolution, but rather the aim of the party in 
establishing a theocratic government.79 
3. The Welfare Party Case and the parameters of Article 11 
In discussing the specific limits to the freedom of association es-
tablished by this case, it is important to note the significant differ-
ences between the Welfare Party Case and those cases in which the 
suspect association simply subscribed to policies contrary to govern-
ment policy, such as the treatment of cultural minorities.80 The court 
 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. ¶¶ 59–63. 
 75. See id. ¶¶ 54–55. 
 76. See id. ¶¶ 76–77. 
 77. See id. ¶ 77. 
 78. See cases discussed supra Part II.B. 
 79. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶ 73. 
 80. For a discussion of these other Article 11 cases, see discussion supra Part II.B. 
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went into great detail in discussing the nature of the specific factual 
allegations and was careful not to make its decision on unfounded 
accusations or unattainable aims, but rather on “achievable” objec-
tives.81 It therefore appears that the outer limit of Article 11 consists 
of some requirement that the association pose a credible and legiti-
mately dangerous threat to the democratic nature or order of the 
state. 
It is also clear that the court’s approval of the government action 
was limited to a narrow set of facts. In upholding the state’s intru-
sion upon the Welfare Party’s freedom of association, the court was 
careful to point out that the dissolution of a political party is a “dras-
tic measure and that measures of such severity [should] be applied 
only in the most serious cases.”82 The court’s historic practice of 
strictly scrutinizing state intrusions upon the freedom of association, 
and rarely upholding such intrusions, substantiates this statement.83 
The court’s decision in the Welfare Party Case, although resulting in 
an affirmance of the state intrusion, should not be seen as a reversal 
or diminishment of the court’s previously strong respect for the free-
dom of association, but rather as defining the extreme limit of that 
freedom. Rather than discouraging groups from associating, the case 
should comfort those groups by finally defining the parameters 
within which their actions will be protected. 
Knowledge of this outer limit is essential if people are to feel free 
to exercise their freedom to associate under Article 11. After the 
Welfare Party Case, groups can confidently evaluate the nature of 
their organization and determine whether it falls within the parame-
ters established by the cases. The case not only strengthens the right 
of association generally under Article 11, but also strengthens the 
more specific argument that, with this newly defined parameter of 
Article 11, the Convention as a whole provides for an implicit right 
of religious organizations to maintain a legal entity. 
III. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT 
Having discussed the parameters of Article 11, including the 
right to a legal entity under Sidiropoulos and the newly defined outer 
 
 81. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶ 77. 
 82. Id. ¶ 82. 
 83. See discussion of cases supra Part II.B (illustrating the court’s vigorous enforcement 
of Article 11 freedoms). 
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limit of those rights under the Welfare Party Case, there remains 
only the final logical step of determining whether there is some rea-
son that would specifically exclude religious organizations from these 
otherwise general protections. Whatever the arguments in favor of 
treating religious groups less favorably—or more skeptically—might 
be, they are not supported by the European Court’s interpretation of 
the European Convention. In fact, the court’s jurisprudence indi-
cates the very opposite—that religious organizations should receive 
more favorable treatment than other types of associations. 
Several factors support the conclusion that religious associations 
are entitled to at least the same, and probably a higher, level of pro-
tection under Article 11 than other types of associations, and some 
factors directly support the proposition that religious associations are 
entitled to legal entity status. These factors include: (A) the tradi-
tionally protected role that religion and religious tradition have 
played throughout European history; (B) the political commitment 
of the member states to recognize the legal entity status of religious 
associations under the Vienna Concluding Document; (C) the lan-
guage of Article 14 of the Convention, which prohibits discrimina-
tion in granting and protecting of the rights under the Convention; 
(D) the language and case law of Article 9 of the Convention itself, 
which grants more favorable protection to religious freedoms; and 
(E) recent cases of the European Court discussing the interplay be-
tween the freedoms of association and religion. 
A. Religious Liberty as a European Tradition 
The history of Europe is a study in religious history.84 Several 
 
 84. Some semblance of European respect for the freedom of religion and conscience 
dates back at least as far as the thirteenth century. See T. Jeremy Gunn, Adjudicating Rights of 
Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 306–07 (Johan D. van der Vyer & John 
Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) (citing C.A. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NATIONAL 
MINORITIES 157–75 (1934); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS 
OF MINORITIES 25–37 (1991); András Baka, The European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Protection of Minorities Under International Law, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 227 (1993); Hurst 
Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the International Protection of the Rights of Minorities, 
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1431–34 (1991); Carol Weisbrod, Minorities and Diversities: 
The ‘Remarkable Experiment’ of the League of Nations, 8 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359 (1993)). 
Some might argue that the tradition potentially dates back to the practice in the Roman Em-
pire under which Jews were “[e]xempt from many external acts of the Roman cult and released 
from all secular activities on the Sabbath, [and] they were held only to prayers for the emperor. 
Before the Christian era began, Judaism was recognized as the only religio licita in the empire 
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European churches—including the Catholic Church, the Anglican 
Church, several Protestant and Orthodox churches, and many oth-
ers—gained prominence as a result of their privileged position in 
states throughout Europe. It is because of this very tradition of asso-
ciative protection that several religious groups resist government 
policies that classify or register religious groups as the same type of 
association as other, non-religious associations. They fear being rele-
gated to a status on par with non-religious associations as opposed to 
their historical position of special protection. Such tradition suggests 
that religious associations have historically maintained favored 
statuses and should be afforded more protection—or, at the very the 
least, the same—protection as other, non-religious, associations. 
Such a favored status is consistent with the strong tradition of re-
ligious freedom in Europe. As the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee announced in a General Comment, 
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (which 
includes the freedom to hold beliefs) in article 18(1) is far-reaching 
 
save the imperial cult itself.” FLANNERY, supra note 1, at 16–17. The Romans also granted 
Jews “all privileges necessary for complete practice of their way of life not only in occupied Pal-
estine but also in Rome and throughout the Diaspora.” Id. at 16; see also NOONAN, supra note 
1, at 19–20 (“The Romans granted to the Jews special ‘privileges and immunities’—a phrase 
that was to make its way into the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 1, and Amend. XIV, § 
1. This policy of special consideration for the Jews in Roman law began with the approach by 
Judas after the attempted annihilation of the Jews by Antiochus Epiphanes.”); PETER GARNSEY 
& RICHARD SALLER, THE ROMAN EMPIRE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE 169–70 
(1987) (suggesting that while the Romans were generous in their accommodations to the 
Jews, the policies of tolerance, which were initiated under Judas Maccabee in 161 B.C.E., and 
later promoted by Julius Caesar, Augustus, and Claudius were really motivated by political ob-
jectives: 
It was from political considerations that toleration was adopted and later abandoned 
in favour of confrontation. . . . The Romans were interested in embarrassing and 
weakening Syria, and agreed to a declaration of friendship. In the following century, 
the Jews lent valuable military assistance first to Caesar and then to Octavian in the 
civil wars, moved by outrage at Pompey’s capture of Jerusalem and violation of the 
Holy of Holies, and by the diplomatic necessity of rallying to the victor of Actium. 
The outcome was a series of official edits and letters to Greek cities in the East in-
structing them to permit resident Jews to observe their traditional religion.  
Id.). 
Flannery points out that these policies did not eliminate anti-Semitism but that the Jews 
were treated poorly throughout the period of the Roman Empire. See FLANNERY, supra note 1, 
at 3–24. However, it was not until Galerius issued the Edict of Toleration for Christians in 311 
C.E., and Constantine and Licinius issued the Edict of Milan in 313 C.E., that the Roman Em-
pire made affirmative steps to end centuries of Christian persecution. See NOONAN, supra note 
1, at 38. For a discussion of Constantine’s policy of Christian toleration, see KENNETH SCOTT 
LATOURETTE, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 86 (1953). 
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and profound; it encompasses freedom of thoughts on all matters, 
personal conviction and the commitment to religion of belief, 
whether manifested individually or in community with others. . . . 
The fundamental character of these freedoms is also reflected in the 
fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of 
public emergency, as stated in article 4(2) of the Covenant.85 
This sentiment is echoed in the travaux preparatoires (essentially 
the legislative history) of the European Convention itself. Perhaps 
the most definitive statement of the purpose and importance of pro-
tecting religious freedom in the European Convention was articu-
lated in the first session of the Consultative Assembly by a delegate 
from Ireland: 
Civil and religious freedom are but two of the fundamental rights 
of man. Notwithstanding this, it is sad to reflect that in many coun-
tries in Europe to-day those elementary freedoms are denied to 
many citizens. If the Council of Europe achieves no other end than 
the guarantee of those two rights, it will have justified its existence. 
There are many other rights to which citizens can bring an indis-
putable claim, but to my mind they are merely subdivisions of 
those.86 
Mr. Everett followed this statement with a plea that all of the 
Representatives attending the Assembly “pledge themselves to secure 
for all citizens, and particularly for any minority in their country, . . . 
freedom from discrimination on account of religious or political 
opinion.”87 The classification of certain rights as “fundamental” was 
clearly important to the drafters. Mr. Teitgen of France, in the open-
ing address of the first session of the Consultative Assembly, articu-
lated the ideal goal of the Convention of “drawing up for Europe a 
complete code of all the freedoms and fundamental rights; all the in-
dividual freedoms and rights, and all the so-called social freedoms 
and rights.”88 He was careful to clarify, however, 
 
 85. CCPR General Comment 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion (Art. 18), para. 8, U.N.H.C.H.R., 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/ 
Rev.1/Add.4 (1993), at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf. 
 86. Statement of Mr. Everett (Aug. 19, 1945), in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 
TRAVUAX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 102–04 
(1975). Mr. Everett’s comments are particularly enlightening considering the significance of 
the religious struggles in Ireland at the time. 
 87. See id. at 104. 
 88. See Statements of Mr. Teitgen (Aug. 19, 1945), in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 
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A full and complete realisation of this aim would, however, be 
something beyond our powers. 
. . . Failing this, however, let us be content with the minimum 
which we can achieve in a very short period, and which consists of 
defining the seven, eight or ten fundamental freedoms that are es-
sential for a democratic way of life and which our countries should 
guarantee to all their people.89 
The drafters found it necessary to limit their efforts to protecting 
the few most important and “fundamental” freedoms. Included on 
the list of these freedoms, which Mr. Teitgen articulated in his ad-
dress, were the “freedom of religious belief, practice and teaching; 
[and] freedom of association and assembly.”90 
The discussion then turned to the issue of which rights would be 
included among these “fundamental freedoms.” From the state-
ments already quoted, and in many others, it is obvious that religious 
freedoms were unquestionably considered to be among those most 
basic fundamental rights to be protected.91 Nevertheless, several of 
the initial delegates articulated a concern about the abuse of the 
freedoms granted by the Convention. In the first session of the Con-
sultative Assembly, a delegate from Greece warned that “human 
freedom, just because it is sacred, must not become an armoury in 
which the enemies of freedom can find weapons which they can later 
use unhindered to destroy this freedom.”92 There was a concern, as 
there is with the grant of any right or freedom, that the rights would 
be abused to the point of diluting the value of the freedom itself. 
While there was legitimate concern about certain individuals in-
fringing on the rights of others, the more apparent fear seems to 
have been that individuals would use these new freedoms to establish 
threats to the states themselves. This fear is evident in a statement 
made by a delegate from the United Kingdom, referring to an ad-
dress by Winston Churchill before the Assembly: “We do not desire 
 
TRAVUAX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 44 (1975). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 46. 
 91. See, e.g., Statement of Mr. Fayat (Aug. 19, 1945), in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF 
THE TRAVUAX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 86 
(1975). 
 92. Statement of Mr. Maccas (Aug. 19, 1945), in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF THE 
TRAVUAX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 108 
(1975). 
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by sentimentality in drafting to give evilly disposed persons the op-
portunity to create a totalitarian Government which will destroy hu-
man rights altogether.”93 To protect against this evil, the drafters in-
cluded a general limitations provision, which eventually became 
Article 17 of the Convention.94 
The extent to which each individual freedom or right may spe-
cifically be limited by a state is outlined in each article. As discussed 
in the previous section, in the case of Article 9, states are allowed 
only those limitations that are in the interests of public safety, pro-
tection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others.95 While the interest of national secu-
rity is mentioned in most of the other articles as a legitimate aim of 
states in limiting those freedoms, the drafters declined to allow such 
an aim in the case of limitations on religion and belief.96 This sug-
gests that while the abuse of rights posed a certain threat to national 
security and other state interests, the exercise of religious rights were 
seen as less of a threat. 
It is also clear from the travaux that although the drafters were 
concerned about threats to state interests, the purpose of the Con-
vention itself was to accord rights to individuals and not to the states 
themselves. Professor Francis Jacobs, in his study of the proper 
method of interpretation of the European Convention, reaches a 
similar conclusion.97 He suggests,  
the provisions should be interpreted objectively; for ‘ . . . the obli-
gations undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Con-
vention are essentially of an objective character, being designed 
rather to protect the fundamental rights of the individual human 
beings from infringement by any of the High Contracting Parties  
 
 93. Statement of Mr. Maxwell-Fyfe (Aug. 19, 1945), in 1 COLLECTED EDITION OF 
THE TRAVUAX PREPARATOIRES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 118 
(1975). 
 94. See European Convention, supra note 3, art. 17.  Article 17 states: 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruc-
tion of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. 
 97.  See FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 16–20 
(1975). 
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than to create subjective and reciprocal rights for the High Con-
tracting Parties themselves.’98  
He therefore appears to agree that the Convention’s primary purpose 
is to protect individual human rights rather than State interests.99  
In considering early statements by delegates to the drafting Con-
ventions, an early European Court stated that 
it clearly appears from these pronouncements that the purpose of 
the High Contracting Parties in concluding the Convention was 
not to concede to each other reciprocal rights and obligations in 
pursuance of their individual national interests but to realise the 
aims and ideals of the Council of Europe, as expressed in its Stat-
ute, and to establish a common public order of the free democra-
cies of Europe.100 
These sentiments of the Convention drafters are consistent with 
several recent decisions of the European Court, of which the follow-
ing is an illustrative example: “The Court recalls that freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a de-
mocratic society within the meaning of the Convention. The plural-
ism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly 
won over centuries, depends on it.”101 
 
 98.  Id. (citing the Pfunders Case, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) 
116, 138 (1960). 
 99.  Professor Jacobs also points out that “any general presumption that treaty obliga-
tions should be interpreted restrictively since they derogate from the sovereignty of the States 
is not applicable to the Human Rights Convention.” Id. He then draws a further conclusion 
that the Convention must be interpreted in a ‘dynamic’ manner, in light of developments in 
social and political attitudes. See id. at 18 (providing several examples of this expansive mode of 
interpretation, including the inclusion of racial discrimination within the concept of degrading 
treatment in Article 3, even though the drafters may not have had racial discrimination in 
mind). In making this conclusion Professor Jacobs recognizes that the “object and purpose” of 
the Convention was not “solely to protect the individual against the threats to human rights 
which were then prevalent, with the result that, as the nature of the threats changed, the pro-
tection gradually fell away. Their intention was to protect the individual against the threats of 
the future, as well as the threats of the past.” Id. It cannot be argued, he suggests, that the ob-
ligations of the Contracting Parties have been extended without their consent, since this ex-
pansive mode of interpretation is consistent with their intention rather than an expansion of 
their intentions. See id. (“It cannot be objected to that this interpretation extends the obliga-
tions of the Contracting States beyond their intended undertakings. On the contrary, this ap-
proach is necessary if effect is to be given to their intentions, in a general sense.”). 
 100. See Pfunders Case, 4 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 138. 
 101. Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, ¶ 60 (2000), at 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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Given the traditionally favored position of religion and religious 
organizations in Europe, it is not unrealistic to conclude that the 
freedom of association is merely an extension to non-religious asso-
ciations of the same type of treatment that religious associations have 
traditionally received. 
B. The Vienna Concluding Document 
The second factor suggesting that religious associations should 
be entitled to greater protection under Article 11 than other types of 
associations is that all of the member states of the Convention have 
agreed to grant all religious associations some type of legal status.102 
The Vienna Concluding Document includes, in Article 16.3, a po-
litical commitment on behalf of all of the participating states to 
“grant upon their request to communities of believers, practising or 
prepared to practise their faith within the constitutional framework 
of their States, recognition of the status provided for them in their 
respective countries.”103 While this agreement is outside the scope of 
the European Convention it nevertheless acts as a political commit-
ment of the participating states to recognize religious associations 
with at least some type of legal status. 
The only apparent justification for state intrusion upon this right 
would be in the case of a religious association whose practice threat-
ens the constitutional order of the country. In the words of Article 
16.3 itself, the “communities of believers” must be “practising or 
prepared to practise their faith within the constitutional framework 
of their states.”104 This limitation is consistent with the limitation es-
tablished in the Welfare Party Case and will be discussed further in 
Part IV. 
This commitment indicates the willingness of the international 
community, and the member states of the European Convention 
specifically, to make the crucial connection between the freedom of 
religion and the right to recognition as a legal entity. The Vienna 
Concluding Document was signed in 1989, nearly thirty-six years af-
ter the signing of the European Convention. If nothing else, this 
 
 102. See Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of Representatives of the Partici-
pating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 28 I.L.M.  527, art. 
16.3 (1989)  [hereinafter Vienna Concluding Document]. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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document serves as an indication of the consensus among the Euro-
pean states that the right to legal entity status is an important part of 
religious freedom. 
C. Article 14 and Religious Discrimination 
A third factor suggesting that religious organizations should re-
ceive at least the same level of associative freedom under the Con-
vention as other associations is the prohibition of discrimination 
based on religion, found in Article 14 of the Convention.105 Article 
14 reads: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Conven-
tion shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as 
sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, association with a national minority, prop-
erty, birth or other status.106 
Article 14 is essentially a supplemental protection to all of the 
other articles of the Convention by prohibiting state discrimination 
in protecting, granting, or interfering with the substantive rights 
identified in those other articles. For example, if a state were to grant 
the right of legal entity status to certain religious groups, or at least 
to the dominant religious group, then Article 14 would appear to 
prohibit the state’s discrimination against minority or new religions 
in granting that right. 
An example of the court’s application of Article 14 is found in 
Hoffmann v. Austria.107 In that case, the applicant, a Jehovah’s Wit-
ness, complained that the Austrian Supreme Court had violated her 
rights under Articles 8, 9, and 14, as well as under Article 2 of Pro-
tocol No. 1.108 The claim involved the Austrian court’s granting cus-
tody of her children to her husband after their divorce.109 In refusing 
to grant her custody, the Austrian court opined that the father would 
be better able to protect the children’s interests since Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses refused to authorize blood transfusions, and since the children 
could be labeled “social outcasts” as Jehovah’s Witnesses.110 
 
 105. See European Convention, supra note 3, art. 14. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 255 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 48 (1993). 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. at 53–54. 
 110. See id. 
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The European Court held that the Austrian Supreme Court’s de-
cision violated Article 8, which protects the right of individuals to a 
“respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspon-
dence.”111 Considering this right in conjunction with the prohibition 
on discrimination based on religion found in Article 14, the court 
found that the distinction based upon religion was not justified by 
any legitimate state aim, and therefore the applicant had been un-
justly deprived of her right of noninterference with family life.112 
A similar analysis would apply in the Article 11 context. If an as-
sociation were denied legal entity status, as required by Article 11, 
on the basis of the association’s religious nature, there would appear 
to be a violation of Article 14. This analysis would apply equally in 
the situation of one religious association being denied registration 
while others were not, as it would in the situation of all religious as-
sociations being denied registration while other, non-religious, 
associations were not. 
D. Article 9 and the Freedom of Religion 
As discussed above,113 European history is a study in the devel-
opment of religious freedom, and it was with this backdrop of his-
torical developments in religious tolerance114 that the European 
Convention was opened for signature in 1950.115 Included among 
the fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention is 
the freedom of “thought, conscience and religion” found in Article 
9.116 Both the text of Article 9 and the court’s recent cases interpret-
ing Article 9, indicate the paramount position that religious freedom 
must play in the comprehensive scheme of rights articulated by the 
Convention. 
1. Article 9: A textual analysis 
The text of Article 9 reads as follows: 
 
 111. European Convention, supra note 3, art. 8. 
 112. See id. at 58–61. 
 113. See supra Part III.A. 
 114. This is not to suggest that Europe, or any of the European states, has been exem-
plary in consistently implementing and executing policies of religious freedom. The Crusades, 
the Inquisition, and the Third Reich are but a few of the more dramatic examples of the falli-
bility of European religious tolerance. 
 115. See European Convention, supra note 3. 
 116. Id. art. 9. 
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in pub-
lic or in private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teach-
ing, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the pro-
tection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.117 
Article 9 specifically guarantees all people the “freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in commu-
nity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”118 The only 
limitations that a state is permitted to impose upon this freedom are 
those that “are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public 
order, health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.”119 
It is important to note that the very language of Article 9 envi-
sions the right to practice religion “in community with others,” and 
not just “in private.”120 As the European Court has recognized, “re-
ligious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form of 
organized structures.”121 The court has reiterated this principle as re-
cently as the spring of this year (2002).122 To deny religious associa-
tions the opportunity to operate as legal entities effectively denies 
them the right to operate in our legalistic society. 
Another significant textual point is that the list of legitimate aims 
that a state may claim in infringing upon the rights articulated in Ar-
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96, ¶ 62 (2000), at 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 122. See Affaire Eglise Metropolitaine de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99, ¶ 118 (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int (“Since religious communities tradi-
tionally exist in the form of organized structures, Article 9 must be interpreted in light of Arti-
cle 11 of the Convention.”) (translation by author). 
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ticle 9 is the shortest of all of the provisions in the Convention.123 
Therefore, states have the fewest possible legitimate aims when the 
intrusion affects a religious right. 
Essentially this second prong of the test is similar to the concept 
in American law requiring strict scrutiny of governmental intrusion 
upon certain fundamental rights.124 Under American law, in a case 
involving fundamental rights, the state must show that it was pursu-
ing a “compelling state interest” in infringing upon the plaintiff’s 
fundamental right.125 Similarly, under the European Convention, the 
state must show that it was pursuing one of the explicitly allowed le-
gitimate aims. The logical conclusion of this comparison is that in 
cases involving fundamental freedoms for which states have the few-
est possible legitimate aims upon which to base an intrusion, the 
European Court should apply the strictest scrutiny. Furthermore, a 
plain reading of the Convention’s text should lead the reader to the 
conclusion that governmental interference with religious freedoms 
should be more highly scrutinized than similar intrusions on other 
freedoms.126 
This textual analysis seems to indicate a clear intent by the draft-
ers to vigorously protect the freedom of thought, conscience, and  
 
 123. The only legitimate aims permitted under Article 9 are the interests of public safety, 
the protection of public order, health, or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. See European Convention, supra note 3. All of the other articles of the Convention 
include longer lists, including such legitimate aims as national security, territorial integrity, the 
economic well-being of the country, and prevention of crime. See id. arts. 6, 8, 10, 11, 12. 
 124. The “strict scrutiny” standard of review arises in several areas of American law, but 
some of the more common examples include the judicial review of state statutes relying upon 
classifications of certain suspect classes such as race and gender, see, e.g., Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), as well the prac-
tice of the courts until recently of scrutinizing state laws infringing religious practices under a 
strict scrutiny standard, see, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 125. See cases cited supra note 124. 
 126. For example, a state might reasonably prohibit a political party from distributing 
literature if the government could show that the literature threatened national security, since 
the protection of national security is a legitimate aim under Article 10 for intruding upon the 
freedom of expression. See European Convention, supra note 3, art. 10. In contrast, the state 
might not be able to justify such a prohibition on the distribution of religious literature as part 
of proselytism efforts, since the distribution is likely a manifestation of religious belief and since 
the protection of national security is not a legitimate aim under Article 9. See id. art. 9; see also 
discussion infra Part III.D.2.c (discussing cases in which the European Court has indicated 
that the Article 10 freedom of expression should sometimes receive less protection than the 
Article 9 freedom of thought, conscience, and belief). 
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belief. This indication is fortified by a historic analysis of the Conven-
tion’s drafting. 
2. Article 9 jurisprudence past and present 
Despite the general tradition of respect for religious pluralism in 
Europe, until recently the European Convention, and Article 9 spe-
cifically, had proven to be an ineffective shield in the defense of reli-
gious freedom, particularly in the hands of new religious movements. 
It has only been in the last decade—approximately since the Euro-
pean Court took a more active role in deciding cases, as opposed to 
the European Commission—that Article 9 has regained vitality in 
practice. 
One scholar has pointed out that from the inception of the 
European Commission—a body whose function is essentially to 
screen cases for the European Court of Human Rights and decide 
which cases are “admissible”—to 1993, approximately forty-five 
cases were published in which applicants raised an Article 9 claim.127 
In none of these cases did the European Commission find a violation 
of Article 9. 128 
A few cases serve as representative samples. In the case of C. v. 
United Kingdom, the European Commission held that the rights 
outlined in Article 9(1) “include only ‘the sphere of personal beliefs 
and religious creeds [that] is sometimes referred to as the forum in-
ternum’ as well as those ‘acts linked’ to the forum internum.”129 Pro-
fessor Gunn points out that prior to Kokkinakis, using this narrow 
interpretation of Article 9, the European Commission had declared 
every application brought by a conscientious objector inadmissible as 
being outside the scope of Article 9, including conscientious objec-
tions to military service and policy, to alternative service, to compul-
sory taxes used to fund the military, to compulsory insurance taxes, 
and to compulsory voting laws.130 
 
 127. See Gunn, supra note 84, at 309–10. 
 128. See DONNA GOMIEN, JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
289 (1995). In the book, Ms. Gomien charts the cases brought before the European Court 
through 1994, organizing them alphabetically, numerically, and by country of origin. The 
number of cases alleging an violation of Article 9 contrast starkly with the number of claims 
made under other articles. 
 129. See Gunn, supra note 84, at 313 n.36 (quoting C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
10358/83, 37 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 142, 147 (1983)). 
 130. See id. at 311 n.24 (citing Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 
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A similar line of cases further illustrates the Commission’s use of 
a narrow interpretation of the freedom of conscience under Article 9. 
In Ahmad v. United Kingdom, the European Commission denied a 
claim by a Muslim schoolteacher who had been denied a schedule 
change in order to attend the Friday prayers mandated by Islam.131 
In rendering this decision, the Commission announced that there 
was no violation of Article 9 since the teacher was aware of the re-
strictions when he accepted the position, and since he had the ability 
to resign if it was absolutely necessary for him to attend.132 Essen-
tially the Commission interpreted Article 9 as allowing a state to in-
fringe upon the religious freedom of its employees so long as it does 
so through contract and allows the employee to resign. Such a read-
ing of Article 9—essentially recognizing the right to believe but not 
to practice those beliefs—falls far short of the protection generally 
accorded “fundamental” rights. It seems completely inconsistent 
with the “fundamental” nature of the freedoms protected in the 
Convention to say that the right to have certain beliefs does not enti-
tle one to practice those beliefs. Yet the early European Commission 
clearly gave little protection to religious liberty under the ac-
 
Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5 (1980) (pacifist protest); C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
10358/83, 37 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 142 (1983) (Quaker war tax); Grandmaison 
and Fritz v. France, App. Nos. 11567/85 and 11568/85, 53 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
150 (1987) (war protest); N. v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 203, 207 (1983) (nonaffiliated pacifist exemption); X. v. Austria, App. No. 5591/72, 43 
Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 161 (1973) (Catholic exemption); Conscientious Objectors 
v. Denmark, App. No. 7565/76, 9 Eur. Comm’n Dec. & Rep. 117 (1977) (pay equality); 
Grandrath v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 2299/64, 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) 324, 336 (1962), 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Comm. Ministers)  
626, 630 (1967) (adopting decision of Commission) (requirement for Jehovah’s Witness offi-
cial); Johansen v. Norway, App. No. 10600/83, 44. Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155, 
162 (1985); X. v. the Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 7705/76, 9 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 196 (1977) (Jehovah’s Witness); Reformed Church of X. v. Netherlands, 
App. No. 1497/62, 5 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm’n) 286, 288 (1962) (old age 
insurance); X. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 1988/66, 10 Y.B. Eur. Conv. H.R. (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R.) 472 (1967)  (automobile insurance); X. v. Netherlands, App. No. 
2065/63, 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.) 266, 270 (1965) (automobile 
insurance); X. v. Austria, App. No. 1753/63, 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 174 (1965) (Eur. 
Comm’n on H.R.); X. v. Austria, App. No. 1718/62, 8 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 168 (1965) 
(Eur. Comm’n on H.R.)). 
 131. Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 126 (1981) 
(Eur. Comm’n). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Gunn, supra note 84, at 314–
16. 
 132. See id. 
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tion/belief distinction.133 For example, in a subsequent case, the 
Commission declared “if the requirements imposed upon a person 
[employed] by the church should be in conflict with his convictions 
he should be free to leave his office, and the Commission regards 
this as an ultimate guarantee of his right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion.”134 
The significance of these cases is that the Article 9 issues never 
reached the European Court because the Commission determined 
that the rights claimed by the applicants fell outside the scope of Ar-
ticle 9. It was not until 1993 that the European Court of Human 
Rights—which, at the time, was beginning to play a more active role 
in hearing cases—found the first violation of Article 9, in the case of 
Kokkinakis v. Greece.135 
Despite the Commission’s historical reluctance to vigorously 
protect the freedom of conscience and belief, the court’s decisions 
on the subject in the last decade—since Kokkinakis—indicate an in-
creased willingness to protect religious freedom. Perhaps the most 
appropriate place to start in analyzing this modern trend is where the 
trend itself began, with Kokkinakis. 
 a. Kokkinakis v. Greece.136 In March of 1986, Mr. Minos Kokki-
nakis and his wife, both Jehovah’s Witnesses, engaged in a discussion 
with Mrs. Kyriakaki in her home.137 Mrs. Kyriakaki’s husband, a can-
tor at the local Orthodox Church, notified the police of the Kokki-
nakis’s proselytism, for which they were then arrested and prosecuted 
under Law No. 1363/1938, which prohibited proselytism.138 After 
exhausting his appeals in Greece, Mr. Kokkinakis applied for relief 
from the European Court.139 
For the first time since the inception of the European Court and 
European Commission, the court found a violation of Article 9 and 
 
 133. Such a strict application of this belief/action distinction is essentially a fiction since 
most religious beliefs require some at least implicit requirement of behavior in conformity 
therewith. 
 134. Karlsson v. Sweden, App. No. 12356/86, 57 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 172, 
175 (1988), cited in Gunn, supra note 84, at 315; see also Knudsen v. Norway, App. No. 
11045/84, 42 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 247 (1985); X. v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many, App. No. 8741/79, 24 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 137, 138 (1981). 
 135. 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). 
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. ¶ 7. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. ¶¶ 9–12. 
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awarded Mr. Kokkinakis damages.140 In a six to three vote, the ma-
jority of the court held that the right to proselytize—so long as it is 
done properly, without brainwashing, corruption, or violence—was 
protected by Article 9, since such a practice is an important manifes-
tation of certain religious beliefs.141 This point was best articulated in 
a concurring opinion by Judge Pettiti: 
Proselytism is linked to freedom of religion; a believer must be able 
to communicate his faith and his beliefs in the religious sphere as in 
the philosophical sphere. Freedom of religion and conscience is a 
fundamental right and this freedom must be able to be exercised 
for the benefit of all religions and not for the benefit of a single 
Church, even if this has traditionally been the established Church 
or “dominant religion.”142 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the case is the court’s will-
ingness to invoke Article 9. In a paragraph that parts dramatically 
from the Commission’s historically apathetic treatment of religious 
issues, the court announced: 
As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and re-
ligion is one of the foundations of a “democratic society” within 
the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, 
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of 
believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset 
for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism 
indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won 
over the centuries, depends on it.143 
As encouraging as these words are, the court’s analysis is even 
more so. Specifically the court avoided two of the misguided patterns 
that previous courts, and the European Commission, had followed in 
addressing Article 9 cases, by (1) not avoiding the Article 9 claim in 
favor of other provisions and by (2) widening the scope of freedoms 
protected by Article 9. 
In his application, Mr. Kokkinakis alleged violations of Articles 7, 
 
 140. See id. ¶¶ 49–50. For a discussion of the significance of the case, as well as its en-
couraging and discouraging implications for the freedom of conscience, see generally Gunn, 
supra note 84. 
 141. Kokkinakis,  260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) ¶ 48. 
 142. Id. (Pettiti, J., concurring). 
 143. Id. ¶ 31. 
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9, 10, and 14.144 Rather than avoiding the Article 9 issue, the court 
began with Article 9, found that it had been violated, and therefore 
found no need to discuss other articles.145 While future courts would 
continue to leave potential Article 9 violations untested in favor of 
resolution on other grounds, such cases can be explained either as 
growing pains or simply fact situations more closely tied to the free-
doms protected in other articles.146 In any case, the Kokkinakis analy-
sis paved the way for future courts to give stricter heed to Article 9 
claims. 
Not only did the case discontinue this first errant pattern, but it 
also widened the scope of the freedoms protected by Article 9. 
Whereas the European Commission had previously limited Article 9 
protection to beliefs and manifestations closely tied to beliefs (the in-
ternal forum), the Kokkinakis court broadened the scope enough to 
protect Mr. Kokkinakis’s proselytism—an act that while clearly a 
tenet of his faith is perhaps less easily tied directly to a religious belief 
than the need to pray.147 
While immediately following the release of the Kokkinakis deci-
sion some scholars showed concern that the case did not go far 
enough,148 Kokkinakis was an important first step in a better direc-
 
 144. See id. ¶ 27. 
 145. See id. ¶¶ 28–57. 
 146. See, e.g., Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, App. No. 23885/94, at 
http://www.echr.coe.int  (1999) (finding a violation of Article 11); Canea Catholic Church v. 
Greece, 1997-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2843 (finding a violation of Article 6); United Communist 
Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (finding a violation of Article 11). 
 147. See Kokkinakis, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 48 (concluding that “bearing Christian 
witness,” or proselytism, “corresponds to true evangelism, which . . . the World Council of 
Churches describes as an essential mission and a responsibility of every Christian and every 
Church”). Compare this with the Commissions’s pre-Kokkinakis decisions in which it con-
strued the Article 9 freedoms very narrowly. See cases discussed supra Part III.D.2. The most 
glaring comparison—as mentioned in the text—is to the court’s decision in Ahmad, upholding 
the denial of a schoolteacher’s request for a change in schedule allowing him to participate in 
Friday prayers. See Ahmad v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 126 
(1981) (Eur. Comm’n). 
 148. Some of the criticism has focused on the ardent nature of the dissenting opinions, 
which show strong support for maintaining a narrow interpretation of Article 9 freedoms—one 
narrow enough to regard proselytism as non-religious behavior. See generally Kokkinakis, 260 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (Valticos, J., dissenting). Professor Gunn has also suggested that even 
the analysis used by the court in reaching the conclusion that Article 9 had been violated indi-
cates that the court did not give the Article 9 issue much concern. See Gunn, supra note 84, at 
321–26. Professor Gunn examines the court’s three-step analysis and determines that “the 
Court’s reasoning in these three steps shows that it made no effort to understand or interpret 
the scope of the fundamental right to manifest a belief. Rather, the Court sought an acceptable 
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
561] Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention 
 597 
tion.149 
b. Manoussakis v. Greece.150 One case to follow in the direction 
set by Kokkinakis was Manoussakis v. Greece.151 In August 1991, Mr. 
Manoussakis, a Jehovah’s Witness, filed an application before the 
European Court alleging violations of Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
and 14.152 His claim arose from his prosecution for operating a place 
of worship without the authorization of the Minister of Education 
and Religious Affairs in violation of a Greek law.153 Following the ex-
ample of Kokkinakis, the court began its analysis with a discussion of 
the Article 9 issues and held that there was indeed a violation.154 The 
court held that the Greek government tended to use the law under 
which Mr. Manoussakis was prosecuted “to impose rigid, or indeed 
prohibitive, conditions on practice of religious beliefs by certain non-
Orthodox movements, in particular Jehovah’s Witnesses.”155 This 
holding was an important step in reversing the commission’s previ-
ous practice of allowing governments to favor established churches 
and disadvantage new religious movements.156 
The Manoussakis decision also made significant strides in widen-
ing the scope of the freedoms protected by Article 9 when it stated, 
“The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Conven-
tion excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine 
whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs 
are legitimate.”157 This statement is encouraging when considered in 
light of the court’s attempts in Kokkinakis to broaden the scope of 
Article 9 freedoms. 
 
compromise for a politically difficult problem.” Id. at 322–23. He then discusses the failure of 
the court to address Mr. Kokkinakis’s claim that the Greek statute could not be prescribed by 
law since it was too vague. Such a finding could potentially have prevented the future applica-
tion of the statute in equally intrusive ways, but the court avoided such a broad finding regard-
ing the statute in general and based its decision on the specific facts of Mr. Kokkinakis’s case. 
See id. at 323–24. 
 149. But cf. Gunn, supra note 84, at 325 (“The Kokkinakis decision exemplifies the fail-
ures of the European Court to take seriously rights of conscience in its jurisprudence.”). 
 150. 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346, ¶ 28. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. ¶ 28. 
 153. See id. ¶¶ 6–12. 
 154. See id. ¶¶ 35–53. 
 155. Id. ¶ 48. 
 156. For a discussion of the application of the Convention to new religious movements, 
see Smith, supra note 11; Gunn, supra note 84, at 308–12. 
 157. Manoussakis,  1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47. 
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As discussed above, prior to Kokkinakis, the protections of Arti-
cle 9 had largely been limited to the internal forum, or to limited ex-
ternal expressions that were very closely tied to beliefs, 158 whereas 
the Kokkinakis court expanded that view somewhat in protecting 
proselytism activities.159 In holding that states do not have the discre-
tion to determine the legitimacy of particular religious practices, the 
Manoussakis court essentially broadened the scope of Article 9 free-
doms even farther than Kokkinakis. In Manoussakis, the court not 
only extended Article 9 protection to actions as opposed to beliefs, 
but also stated that states could not even inquire into the legitimacy 
of actions as expressions of beliefs.160 Obviously, such a standard 
must have its bounds, and states clearly have legitimate reasons, hav-
ing nothing to do with religion, for regulating zoning and other 
property uses. Nevertheless, the Manoussakis court went quite far in 
holding that those legitimate aims were not proportionate to the de-
nial of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ right to maintain a place of worship. 
This holding has particular significance for religious organiza-
tions seeking recognition as a legal entity, since such status is often 
required in order to lease or own property for worship. The holding 
would appear to limit states’ ability to question the religious nature 
of organizations seeking registration as churches or other forms of 
legal entities.  
c. Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria161 and Wingrove v. UK.162 
The court made another significant step in two other post-
Kokkinakis cases: Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria163 and Wingrove 
v. UK.164 In these cases the court faced the difficult question of 
whether religious justifications should be sufficient grounds to in-
fringe upon Article 10 freedom of expression.165 In both cases the re-
spective government had either denied permits for distribution, or 
had banned certain videos and films because the content of the films 
 
 158. See discussion supra Part III.D.2. 
 159. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Manoussakis,  1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 47. 
 161. 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3 (1994). 
 162. 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937 (1996). 
 163. See Otto-Preminger-Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3. 
 164. See Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1937. 
 165. For a discussion of these cases and their significance for the interplay between Article 
10 and Article 9 freedoms, see Willi Fuhrmann, Perspectives on Religious Freedom from the Van-
tage Point of the European Court of Human Rights, 2000 BYU L. REV. 829, 835–37. 
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was offensive to the religious beliefs of a majority of the people and 
violated blasphemy laws.166 The applicants in both cases claimed vio-
lations of their freedom of expression under Article 10. However, in 
both cases, the court upheld the governmental action based on the 
rationale that, since the films were attacks upon religion, “the man-
ner in which religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed or denied is 
a matter which may engage the responsibility of the State, notably its 
responsibility to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the right guaran-
teed under Article 9 to the holders of those beliefs and doctrines.”167 
The court was careful in Wingrove to point out that while not every 
law banning or controlling anti-religious expression will be upheld 
under the Convention, there are nevertheless justifiable circum-
stances in which such religious principles will warrant an infringe-
ment upon freedom of expression.168 
While at least one commentator has suggested that one should 
not “conclude from these cases that where there are competing 
Convention interests, considerable weight is attached to the Article 9 
interest” and that the cases merely stand for the proposition that 
“the relationship between freedom of expression and freedom of re-
ligion should be decided by democratic governments,”169 such a 
conclusion seems unavoidable. Although the cases may not go so far 
as creating a religious exception to the Article 10 freedom of expres-
sion, they certainly go at least as far as holding that where there are 
competing Article 10 and Article 9 interests, the Article 9 interest 
should be given considerable weight. How else could the court have 
justified the applicants’ clearly established Article 10 rights? There 
was no question that the applicants’ freedom of expression had been 
intruded upon. The decisions rested on determinations that the in-
trusions were necessary in a democratic society. 
These cases also have important implications for religious organi-
zations seeking to maintain legal entity status. In addressing the po-
tential argument that religious associations are less deserving of Arti-
 
 166. See Otto-Preminger-Institut, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8–9; Wingrove, 1996-V 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1943–44. 
 167. Otto-Preminger-Institut,  295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18; see also Wingrove, 1996-
V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1956–57. 
 168. See Wingrove, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1957–59 (restating the requirement that the 
governmental means must be proportional to the anti-religious nature of the material it is 
regulating). 
 169. Fuhrmann, supra note 165, at 837. 
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cle 11 protection than other, non-religious, associations it is impor-
tant to note that the European Court has indicated that Article 9 
may hold a paramount place among the rights guaranteed by the 
Convention.  
d. Other cases. In addition to these most influential cases are sev-
eral post-Kokkinakis cases illustrating the court’s broadening view of 
Article 9’s importance. Most recently the court found Article 9 viola-
tions in 1999 in Serif v. Greece170 and in 2000 in Thlimmenos v. 
Greece171 and Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria.172 In all three of these 
cases the court followed the three-step analysis of Kokkinakis, and in 
all three cases the court began its analysis with Article 9.173 While the 
viability and strength of Kokkinakis may have been questioned in 
1993,174 and while some of those concerns remain valid, the consis-
tency of these recent cases indicate that the Kokkinakis decision was, 
if arguably nothing more, an encouraging turn in the road of Article 
9 jurisprudence—a turn toward the direction intended by the text 
and indicated by the travaux preparatoires of the Convention.175 
E. The Interplay Between Articles 9 and 11 
The final, and perhaps most persuasive, factor suggesting that re-
ligious organizations should have a right to legal entity status under 
Article 11 is the fact that the court has explicitly ruled that the free-
 
 170. App. No. 38161/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 171. App. No. 34369/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 172. App. No. 30985/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 173. In Thlimmenos, the court technically bases its decision on “Article 14 of the Con-
vention taken in conjunction with Article 9,” finding discrimination based on religion. Thlim-
menos, App. No. 34369/97, ¶ 49. 
 174. Writing in 1993, without the benefit of these more recent cases, Professor Gunn, 
cited and quoted repeatedly in Part III.D.2, discussing the European Commission’s historical 
reluctance in enforcing Article 9 freedoms, identifies the encouraging aspects of the Kokkinakis 
decision, but ultimately questions whether it really indicates the court’s willingness to seriously 
address Article 9 issues. See Gunn, supra note 84, at 325–30 (“The Kokkinakis decision exem-
plifies the failure of the European Court to take seriously rights of conscience in its jurispru-
dence.”). With the benefit of these more recent cases, my position is that while there was, and 
is, reason to question the seriousness with which the Kokkinakis court addressed the issues, the 
more recent cases indicate that Kokkinakis has played an enduring role in correcting at least 
some the court’s prior errant patterns. 
 175. Recall the previous textual and historic analyses of Article 9 supra Part III.D.1–2, 
suggesting that the intent of the drafters of the Convention was for the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and belief to maintain a paramount place among the fundamental rights protected 
by the Convention. 
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dom of religion must be applied in a manner consistent with the 
freedom of association under Article 11. The two best examples of 
this rule are the cases of Hasan and Chaush176 and Metropolitan 
Church of Bessarabia.177 These cases have both been announced in 
the previous two years and are strong indications of the court’s cur-
rent willingness to grant religious organizations associative freedom. 
1. Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria 
In this case, the applicants, Hasan and Chaush, alleged that the 
Bulgarian government had effectively forced their replacement as 
leaders of their Muslim religious denomination.178 In 1992, Mr. 
Hasan had been elected to be the Chief Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims, 
and the Bulgarian Directorate of Religious Denominations had regis-
tered him as such.179 In 1994, the followers of a previous mufti, Mr. 
Gendzhev, organized a national conference and elected Mr. Gendz-
hev to be the Chief Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims, and the Directorate 
of Religious Denominations, despite complaints by Hasan, registered 
the Gendzhev as the new official leader of the Bulgarian Muslims.180 
It appears from the European Court’s opinion that the government’s 
“motivation behind this act had been the understanding that the 
Muslim religion in Bulgaria could have only one leadership and one 
statute.”181 In other words, the Bulgarian government refused to of-
ficially recognize—or grant registered status to—more than one le-
gitimate Muslim religious denomination. Despite their appeals to 
Bulgarian courts, Hasan and Chaush were unable to receive relief. 
The European Court, hearing the appeal, held that the government’s 
actions violated Article 9.182 
The significance of this case lies partially in the court’s determi-
nation of whether to apply Article 9 or Article 11. While the appli-
cants had urged the court to apply Article 9 and find a violation of 
their religious freedom, the Bulgarian government urged the court 
to simply apply Article 11 and find that “not every act motivated by 
 
 176. Hasan and Chaush, App. No. 30985/96. 
 177. Affaire Eglise Metropolitaine de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99 (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 178. See Hasan and Chaush, App. No. 30985/96, ¶ 3. 
 179. See id. ¶ 13. 
 180. See id. ¶¶ 15–16, 23. 
 181. See id. ¶ 28. 
 182. See id. ¶ 89. 
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
602 
religious belief could constitute a manifestation of religion, within 
the meaning of Article 9.”183 Essentially the Bulgarian government 
was arguing that Article 9 did not apply because the dispute involved 
the applicants’ participation in the religious denomination and not a 
manifestation of their religious belief. The government was arguing 
that the right to participate in a religious association is not part of 
the Article 9 freedoms. 
The court rejected the government’s argument and applied Arti-
cle 9. In doing so the court stated, 
religious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form 
of organised structures. They abide by rules which are often seen by 
followers as being of a divine origin. Religious ceremonies have 
their meaning and sacred value for the believers if they have been 
conducted by ministers empowered for that purpose in compliance 
with these rules. The personality of the religious ministers is un-
doubtedly of importance to every member of the community. Par-
ticipation in the life of the community is thus a manifestation of 
one’s religion, protected by Article 9 of the Convention.184 
Having recognized the importance of the right of association to 
an effective exercise of religious freedom, the court went on to clarify 
that the protections of Article 11 are necessary to protect individuals’ 
freedom of religion. The court stated: 
Where the organisation of the religious community is at issue, Arti-
cle 9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Conven-
tion which safeguards associative life against unjustified State inter-
ference. . . . Were the organisational life of the community not 
protected by Article 9 of the Convention, all other aspects of the 
individual’s freedom of religion would become vulnerable.185 
The obvious conclusion is that the court refused to apply either 
Article 9 or Article 11 exclusively, and declared, 
the Court does not consider that the case is better dealt with solely 
under Article 11 of the Convention, as suggested by the Govern-
ment. Such an approach would take the applicants’ complaints out 
of their context and disregard their substance. . . . Insofar as they 
touch upon the organisation of the religious community, the Court 
 
 183. See id. ¶ 57. 
 184. Id. ¶ 62. 
 185. Id. 
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reiterates that Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of the pro-
tection afforded by Article 11 of the Convention.186 
While it was not directly at issue in the Hasan and Chaush case, 
one of the “protections afforded by Article 11” is the right to regis-
ter a legal entity.187 As the Sidiropoulos court pronounced, “That citi-
zens should be able to form a legal entity in order to act collectively 
in a field of mutual interest is one of the most important aspects of 
the right to freedom of association, without which that right would 
be deprived of any meaning.”188 
Read together, as they must be, these two cases establish the 
unmistakable conclusion that religious entities are entitled to register 
as a legal entity as part of their rights under both Article 9 and Arti-
cle 11. This conclusion is further strengthened by one of the court’s 
most recent cases, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova.189 
2. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova 
The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia case is the most recent 
cases to address the issue of freedom of religious association and the 
first to directly address the right of religious associations to register 
as a legal entity. The case involves the efforts of the members of the 
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia in Moldova to register with the 
Moldavian government as a recognized church. The Church of Bes-
sarabia is an Orthodox congregation with 117 congregations in 
Moldova, three in the Ukraine, one in Lithuania, one in Latvia, two 
in Russia, and one in Estonia.190 The church applied for registration 
with the Moldavian government several times but was repeatedly de-
nied registration on the grounds that it was not a separate religion, 
but rather a schism of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova.191 
The church then sought relief in the Moldavian courts and while 
intermediary courts initially reversed the government’s decision, the 
Supreme Court of Justice—the highest court in Moldova—
 
 186. Id. ¶ 65. 
 187. See Sidiropoulos v. Greece, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1594, 1614–15. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Affaire Eglise Metropolitaine de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99 (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
 190. See id. ¶ 12. 
 191. See id. ¶¶ 13–30. 
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eventually upheld the refusal of registration.192 The Supreme Court 
of Justice held that the church had failed to meet certain procedural 
requirements, and that  
in any case, the Government’s refusal to grant the applicants’ re-
quest did not constitute a violation of their freedom of religion as 
guaranteed by the international treaties, and in particular Article 9 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, since the inter-
ested parties were Orthodox Christians and could manifest their 
beliefs within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, which the 
Government had recognized in a decision on February 7, 1993.193  
The Supreme Court further held that “additionally, the applicants 
could manifest their beliefs freely, that they had access to churches, 
and that they had not shown proof of any obstruction of the exercise 
of their religion.”194 
The church again applied for relief with the government and re-
ceived a letter from the Prime Minister refusing their request and in-
dicating “that the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia did not consti-
tute a sect within the meaning of the law, but a schismatic group of 
the Metropolitan Church of Moldova.”195 The church then applied 
to the European Court. 
After citing the facts and allegations of both sides, and after not-
ing that under Moldavian domestic law only registered churches can 
practice their religion in Moldova, the European Court addressed 
the case under Article 9. While the church alleged that failure to rec-
ognize the church prohibited them from practicing their religion, the 
government argued that the applicants, as an Orthodox Christian 
Church, did not practice a unique religion since the Christian Or-
thodox Church was already recognized by the government.196 Fol-
lowing its traditional mode of analysis, the court determined that the 
refusal to register the church constituted an interference with the 
church’s freedom of religion, that the interference was prescribed by 
law, and that it was in furtherance of the legitimate state aims of pro-
tecting order and public security.197 
 
 192. See id. ¶ 26. 
 193. Id. (translation by author). 
 194. Id. (translation by author). 
 195. Id. ¶ 28  (translation by author). 
 196. See id. ¶ 98. 
 197. See id. ¶¶ 106, 110, 113. 
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In analyzing the final question of whether the interference was 
necessary in a democratic society, the court recognized that to re-
quire a divided religious community “to place itself, against its will, 
under a single leadership, would equally constitute an infringement 
of religious freedom.”198 The court then reiterated the principles es-
tablished in Hasan and Chaush: 
[R]eligious communities traditionally exist in the form of organized 
structures; Article 9 must be interpreted in the light of Article 11 of 
the Convention which protects associations [or this could be inter-
preted: associative life] from all unjustifiable interference from the 
State. Seen in this light, the right of the faithful to religious free-
dom, which includes the right to manifest their religion collec-
tively, assumes that the faithful are able to associate with one an-
other freely, without arbitrary interference from the State. In effect, 
the autonomy of religious communities is indispensable to plural-
ism in a democratic society and thus finds itself at the heart of the 
protection offered by Article 9.199 
Additionally, one of the ways of exercising the right to manifest 
one’s religion, especially for a religious community, in the collective 
sense, is through the possibility of assuring the jurisdictional pro-
tection of the community, of its members and their possessions, 
such that Article 9 must be understood in the light not only of Ar-
ticle 11, but also in the light of Article 6.200 
The court then concluded that since only registered religious 
congregations are allowed such privileges as having legal personality, 
the right to produce and sell specific religious objects, and the right 
to hire officials and employees, effectively only registered congrega-
tions may organize and function.201 Furthermore, the court noted, 
without legal personality the church cannot participate in the legal 
system to protect its interests. Based on these conclusions, the court 
 
 198. Id. ¶ 117  (translation by author). 
 199. Id. ¶ 118  (translation by author). 
 200. Id. (translation by author). In referring to Article 6, the court cites the European 
Commission report in the case of Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, in which the Commission 
stated that it “cannot see any plausible reason for the fact that in 1996, the Greek Catholic 
Church still does not enjoy a precise legal status—which obviously deprives it of the ability to 
guarantee the effective protection of its possessions used to manifest its freedom of religion.” 
Canea Catholic Church v. Greece, 1997-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 2843, 2868. 
 201. Affaire Eglise Metropolitaine de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99, ¶ 129 (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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held that the refusal of registration had such serious consequences on 
the applicants’ religious liberty that the state interferences could not 
be justified as proportional to the legitimate aim sought nor as neces-
sary in a democratic society.202 
This case sets an important precedent for religious associations 
seeking legal entity status. The court essentially held that refusal of 
legal entity status violates the Convention—in the Bessarabia case 
under Article 9, but presumably the court could have reached the 
same conclusion under Article 11 as well—if such refusal effectively 
prohibits the religious association from practicing its religion, such as 
by an inability to participate in the legal system, to hire and pay em-
ployees, to produce and distribute religious materials, to gather in 
meetings, etc. It is difficult to imagine a legislative scheme that 
would refuse registration of religious associations and yet not deprive 
that association of one of these essential rights or privileges. At the 
very least, legislation that refuses recognition or registration will al-
most always deny the religious association the right to participate in 
the legal system as an entity, which is essential to rent facilities, pay 
employees, etc. 
It is not surprising that this most recent case makes the most per-
suasive argument that religious associations are entitled to legal en-
tity status. As the history of Article 9 and Article 11 indicates, the 
court’s jurisprudence under both articles has been heading in this di-
rection. Having answered the question of whether such a right exists, 
the only remaining issue for the European Court will be to establish 
what limits a state may justifiably place on this right. 
IV. ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT  
OF LEGAL ENTITY STATUS 
The European Court has essentially established two separate 
standards for identifying a justifiable limitation upon the right of a 
religious association to maintain legal entity status. In order for a 
state to deny registration or official recognition to a religious group, 
it must satisfy either of these narrow exceptions. The first was estab-
lished in the Welfare Party Case, and the second in the Bessarabia 
Case. 
 
 202. See id. ¶ 130. 
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
561] Legal Entity Status Under the European Convention 
 607 
A. The Welfare Party Case and Threats to Democratic Order 
As discussed above, in the Welfare Party Case, the court upheld 
the dissolution of the Welfare Party based on the conclusion that the 
Welfare Party had exhibited a realistic and actual intention of estab-
lishing a theocratic government with a plurality of legal systems, as 
well as a reasonably unambiguous stance toward the use of violence 
to gain power.203 While the court cautioned that the dissolution of a 
political party—and presumably the refusal to initially recognize or 
subsequently dissolve other types of associations—was a “drastic 
measure and that measures of such severity might be applied only in 
the most serious cases,”204 it was nevertheless convinced of the wis-
dom of dissolution in this case, due to the dangerous threat that the 
Welfare Party posed to the democratic order of the state.  
 This holding reveals the first exception to, or limitation on, the 
right to legal entity status: a state may deny such status when the 
group poses a threat to the democratic order of the state. As the 
court stated, 
since the pluralism of ideas and parties is itself an inherent part of 
democracy, a State may reasonably forestall the execution of such a 
policy [the removal of secular government and establishment of a 
plurality of legal systems], which is incompatible with the Conven-
tion’s provisions, before an attempt is made to implement it 
through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the 
country’s democratic regime.205 
It is important to note two limitations that the court put on this 
already narrow exception. First, it cautioned that the threat must be 
neither “theoretical nor illusory, but achievable.”206 This limitation 
would prevent the dissolution of organizations that have radical or 
revolutionary, yet unrealizable, objectives. 
Second, the court cautioned that the margin of appreciation 
granted the states in this type of a matter is narrow.207 Given the di-
versity of situations among the member states, the European Court 
has traditionally granted a “margin of appreciation” within which 
 
 203. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶ 81. 
 204. Id. ¶ 82. 
 205. Id. ¶ 81. 
 206. See id. ¶ 77. 
 207. See id. ¶ 81. 
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each state may implement the rules of the Convention. This margin 
of appreciation allows for some flexibility in implementation while 
maintaining the integrity of the substantive rules. Usually the margin 
of appreciation is intended to include conduct and policies that 
would be accepted by a consensus of the member states.208 In the 
case of denying legal entity status, in the Welfare Party Case the 
court explained that the margin of appreciation must be narrow, 
meaning that it will tolerate very little deviation on the part of the 
member states.209 
In summary, the first exception to the general right of legal en-
tity status is that a state may deny such status to any organization 
that poses a realistic objective of threatening the democratic, or plu-
ralistic, order of the state. 
B. The Bessarabia Case and Retention of the Ability  
to Practice Religion 
The second exception is found in the Bessarabia case. In that 
case, the court invalidated the Moldavian government’s attempts to 
deny legal entity status to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, 
but based that decision on the premise that denial of registration 
would effectively prohibit the church from practicing certain aspects 
of its religion.210 It is therefore conceivable that the court would al-
low a state to deny registration or legal entity status to a religious 
group if doing so would not prohibit the group from doing any of 
the things listed in the Bessarabia case, such as having legal personal-
ity, participating in the legal system, hiring and paying employees, 
producing and distributing religious materials, etc. 
From a practical perspective this exception seems difficult to real-
ize, since denial of registration almost always includes a denial of le-
gal personality. Without legal personality, a religious association 
would usually be unable to perform many of the necessary functions 
of a typical religious organization. 
 
 208. A good example of a consensus position on this issue might be the specific language 
of the Vienna Concluding Document, which requires that each state grant all religious organi-
zations the type of legal status it has established for other religious organizations. See Vienna 
Concluding Document, supra note 102. 
 209. See Welfare Party Case, supra note 30, ¶ 81. 
 210. See Affaire Eglise Metropolitaine de Bessarabie et autres c. Moldova, App. No. 
45701/99, ¶ 129 (2002), at http://www.echr.coe.int. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Considering the narrowness of the exceptions and the European 
Court’s willingness to protect religious associations from unjustified 
state interference, it seems clear that the general right of religious as-
sociations to maintain legal status is likely to be explicitly and vigor-
ously protected throughout the foreseeable future. Unfortunately it 
is not clear that all of the member states are currently operating un-
der systems that comply with the standards discussed in this paper. 
As the court continues to pursue these principles, it is likely that sev-
eral states will have to modify their registration processes to accom-
modate all religious associations. Arbitrary limitations on registra-
tion, such as requiring a minimum number of adherents, a minimum 
amount of time in the country, or even certain nationality require-
ments, appear to be in jeopardy of being challenged and condemned 
by the European Court. In our increasingly legalistic and regulatory 
world, it is only without these unjustified restrictions on legal status 
that religious association will truly be free.  
Lance S. Lehnhof 
LEH-FIN.DOC 6/6/02  10:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
610 
 
